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DOCUMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN MISSOURI
In addition to tailormade management structure, dose corporations
have several other needs that the Missouri statute does not satisfy. The
doctrine of delectus personae should be recognized for the close corporation
by expressly allowing enumerated restrictions on alienation of shares.
Somewhat akin to this is the need to protect the minority shareholder who
is locked in, either because of restrictions on alienation or because of
lack of a market for his stock. Two changes in the Missouri statute are
needed to remedy this problem: (1) the parties should be free to arrange
by contract the conditions precedent to and the terms of dissolution and
liquidation; and (2) the statute should broaden the power of equity courts
to decree liquidation on the grounds of "internal dissension." Finally,
the statute should allow dose corporations to operate free of the cumber-
some formality required of larger corporations.
Because the shareholder's agreement is central to almost all of the
foregoing proposals, the statute should address itself to the difficult prob-
lems of specific performance of shareholder's agreements. Generally the
statute should encourage specific performance whenever control is at
stake or when damages would otherwise be an inadequate remedy. The
problems of specific performance are too complex, however, for mechanical
statutory treatment; ultimately the solution must be left largely to judicial
discretion.
CHmuxs E. BUCHANAN
DOCUMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of documents as evidence is both commonplace and com-
plex. Documents taking the form of certificates, records, books, and papers
are often useful in litigation. Insurance records, birth certificates, deeds,
and even printed statute books are examples of documents whose ad-
mission as evidence may be crucial to the trial lawyer. Yet, the use of a
document as evidence may raise at least five questions for the attorney.
First, what proof is necessary to authenticate the document? Second, are
copies admissible, and if so, what weight are they accorded? Third, does
the document come within an exception to the hearsay rule? Fourth, if so,
does that exception also obviate the objection that the contents of the
document were hearsay as to its preparer? Finally, what evidentiary weight
will be given the document if admitted?
Missouri has enacted numerous statutes which answer many of the
questions outlined above but which may be difficult to find because
they are scattered throughout the statute books. This comment is an at-
tempt to collect and index these statutes, and to show how compliance
with them can aid the trial lawyer in using documents as evidence.
I. EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE USE OF DOCUMENTS
The following discussion will outline the broad evidentiary prob-
lems with which the statutes often deal.
1
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A. Authentication
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant to the issues in the law-
suit. The relevance of a writing to a particular issue often depends on
the existence of a logical connection betveen the writing and a particu-
lar individual.' In this situation, a showing of relevance consists of
proof of authorship.2 Such proof is one requirement of authentication 8
A second requirement of authentication is proof of what the docu-
ment is, e.g., a letter, contract, or deed. Thus, to authenticate a deed from
X to Y, the proponent must prove not only that X authored the document,
but also that it is in fact a deed.
Documents may be authenticated in several ways. The most common
is by direct proof, either by the testimony of attesting witnesses or by
proof that the signature on the document is in the handwriting of the
purported author. This comment is concerned with a third method of
authentication: compliance with the terms of an applicable statute.
The Missouri authentication statutes vary in terms of their re-
quirements and effect according to the particular document involved. To
the extent compliance with the statutes authenticates the documents, it
does so with respect to both requirements, i.e., proof of what the docu-
ment is and proof of authorship. The statutes differ on the basis for au-
thentication. One type provides for authentication based on the circum-
stances surrounding the document's production in evidence. This includes
statutes that create a presumption of authenticity arising from the age
of the document 4 and statutes that authenticate documents held by public
officials.5 The other type of statute provides that the authenticity of a.
document may be shown by its contents. 6 These statutes deal with docu-
ments commonly referred to as "self-identifying" because the document
may be admitted without testimony of an authenticating witness. 7
The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence8 eliminate many of the
technical common law requirements for authentication of documents. The
Proposed Rules provide that authentication is satisfied by proof suf-
ficient to support a finding that the document in question is what its
1. C. McCoRmica, EVIDENCE § 218 (2d ed. 1972).
2. See Cummins v. Dixon, 265 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. 1954); Davison v. Farr, 273
S.W.2d 500 (Spr. Mo. App. 1954); United Factories, Inc. v. Brigham, 117 S.W.2d
662 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938); Lentz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 100 S.W.2d 588(K.C. Mo. App. 1937); Dorroh v. Wall, 297 S.W. 705 (Spr. Mo. App. 1927).
3. Proof of authenticity of a writing is not required where execution of
the writing is not in issue, but only the existence of such writing. See Mincielli
v. Sloan's Moving & Storage Co., 303 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1957).
4. See, e.g., § 490.380, RSMo 1969.
5. An example of custody as proof of authentication is provided by statutes
that permit a certified copy from an official custodian to be admitted in evi-
dence. Under these statutes proof of the genuineness of the copy is not required
but is presumed from the fact that the copy is from a public official. See, e.g.,
§ 490.180, RSMo 1969.
6. Authentication by contents includes proof of the genuineness of printed
statute books and reports of decisions. See, e.g., § 490.010, RSMo 1969.
7. See, e.g., § 490.190 RSMo 1969.
8. PROP. FED. R. Evw. (Rev. Draft 1971).
[Vol. 88
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proponent contends it is. 9 This proposition is illustrated by the following
provisions which specify what proof satisfies authentication:
Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by
law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a
public office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or
data compilation, in any form, is from the public office where
items of this nature are kept.10
Ancient documents or data compilations. Evidence that a docu-
ment or data compilation, in any form, is in such condition as to
create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, was in a place
where it, if authentic, would likely be, and has been in existence
20 years or more at the time it is offered.1 '
The Proposed Rules further provide that extrinsic evidence of au-
thenticity is not a prerequisite to the admission of certain documents.' 2
Also, the Proposed Rules reverse the common law rule on authentication
by providing that the testimony of a subscribing witness is unnecessary to
authenticate a writing unless required by the jurisdiction whose laws govern
the validity of the writing.13
B. Admission of Copies
Admission of copies into evidence poses an additional authentication
problem-proof that the copy is a true and accurate representation of the
original. Many of the Missouri authentication statutes deal with the use
of copies as evidence. Compliance with them makes the copies covered by
the statute competent evidence without further proof that the copy is
genuine.
The best evidence rule presents another ground for objection to the
admission of a copy of a document. It requires that "in proving the terms
of a -writing, where the terms are material, the original writing must be
produced unless it is shown to be unavailable for some reason other than
the serious fault of the proponent."'14 The rationale behind the rule is
that the most accurate evidence available should be produced.' 5
Production of the original is sometimes excused. In some instances,
a duplicate or carbon copy is treated as an original for evidentiary pur-
poses.16 Also, where the contents of a writing are not in issue' 7 or where
9. Id. 901.
10. Id. 901 (b) (7).
11. Id. 901 (b) (8).
12. Id. 902.
13. Id. 903.
14. C. McCoRMCK, supra note 1, at 560. See also PROP. FED. R. EviD. 1002
(Rev. Draft 1971).
15. C. McCoPi,,cK, supra note 1, § 229. The best evidence rule is followed
in Missouri. See State v. Elgin, 391 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. 1965); Bolling Co. v. Bar-
rington Co., 398 S.W.2d 28 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965); Sargent v. Wekenman, 374
S.W.2d 685 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
16. See Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority v. Zitko, 386 S.W.2d
69 (Mo. En Banc 1964); State v. McCollum, 377 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1964); Schroer
v. Schroer, 248 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1952). See § 109.130 RSMo 1969 (copies of public
records deemed originals). See also PROP. FED. R. EvD. 1003 (Rev. Draft 1971).
17. See State ex rel. State Highway Conm'n v. Galeener, 402 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.
1966); State ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. En Banc 1963); Aviation
1973]
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the contents are proved by an independent source,18 the original is not
required. In addition, production of the original will be excused where:
(1) it is lost or destroyed; 19 (2) it is in the possession of a third party not
a party to the lawsuit;2 0 or (3) it is in the possession of an adverse party
to the lawsuit who failed to produce it after notice.2 1 Missouri recognizes
a fourth exception: where the original papers are extremely complex. In
this situation, a summary of the originals is sometimes admissible.22
Finally, some courts have recognized an exception where the original is a
public document.2 3 This common law exception has been codified in
several Missouri statutes.
Once production of the original is excused, the court must determine
what secondary evidence will be admissible in its place. Under the English
rule, no preference exists among the alternate methods for proving the
contents of the writing.24 The majority view, which is recognized in Mis-
souri,2 5 discriminates between types of secondary evidence and prefers a
copy to oral testimony and may prefer an immediate copy to a more
remote one.2 6 The Proposed Rules of Evidence follow the English rule.
The drafters of the rules reason that the normal motivation of a party
to present the most convincing evidence possible makes it unnecessary to
establish an extended scheme of preferences for secondary evidence.27
C. Hearsay
Hearsay objections are frequently raised to bar the introduction of
documents in evidence. "Hearsay" refers to evidence that rests on the
competency of out-of-court assertions made by someone other than the
testifying witness. Such evidence is not admissible to prove the truth of
Enterprises v. Cline, 395 S.W.2d 306 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965); St. Louis Hosp. Equip.
Co. v. Superior Refrig. Mfg. Co., 246 S.W.2d 532 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952); Eckner
v. Western Hair 8 Beauty Supply Co., 236 Mo. App. 988, 162 S.W.2d 621 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1942). See generally PROP. FED. R. Evm. 1004 (Rev. Draft 1971).
18. See State v. Tyson, 363 Mo. 1242, 258 S.W.2d 651 (1953); Central and S.
Truck Lines, Inc. v. Westfall G.M.C. Truck, Inc., 317 S.W.2d 841 (K.C. Mo. App.
1958).
19. State v. McDaniel, 392 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1965); State v. Anderson, 384
S.W.2d 591 (Mo. En Banc 1964); Wilson v. Supreme Liberty Life Ins. Co., 343
S.W.2d 649 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Welch v. Noah, 52 S.W.2d 493 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1932).
20. Thurman v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 308 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. 1957).
21. Baker v. Spears, 357 Mo. 601, 210 S.W.2d 13 (1948).
22. Thompson v. Arthur L. Hardin Associates, Inc., 219 S.W.2d 860 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1949).
23. See C. McCoamvcK, supra note 1, § 240. See also PROP. Frm. R. EVID. 1005
(Rev. Draft 1971).
24. See Doe d. Gilbert v. Ross, 7 M. & W. 102, 151 Eng. Rep. 696 (Ex.
1840); W. C. Beaty 1= Co. v. Southern Ry., 80 S.C. 527, 61 S.E. 1006 (1908);
Rich Furniture Co. v. Smith, 202 S.W. 99 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). For general
discussions see Birdseye, Degrees of Secondary Evidence, 6 WASH. L. Rv. 21
(1931); 38 MiCH. L. REv. 864 (1940).
25. See Schrivner v. American Car & Foundry Co., 330 Mo. 408, 50 S.W.2d
1001 (En Banc 1932).
26. C. McCotiRcn, supra note 1, § 23.
27. PROP. FED. R. EvID. 1004, Advisory Committee's Note (Rev. Draft 1971).
[Vol. 38
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the matters asserted.28 Documents that are offered to prove the truth of
their contents are subject to a hearsay objection because they necessarily
involve the out-of-court statements of a dedarant. The business records
and official records exceptions to the hearsay rule are particularly ap-
plicable to solve hearsay problems involved in the admission of these
documents.
A double hearsay problem arises when the person who prepared the
documents did not have personal knowledge of the contents of the state-
ments he recorded. The contents of the document, as well as the docu-
ment itself, is hearsay; if the document is offered to prove the truth of its
contents, a second exception must be found for the hearsay in the original
recording. In some instances, the official records and business records
exceptions may solve both hearsay problems.
At common law, an exception to the hearsay rule was made for records
prepared in the course of business. This business records exception re-
quired that the record entries be made by someone with personal knowl-
edge of the information.2 9 Thus, the common law business records ex-
ception permits the admission of business records to show the truth of
their contents only where the information recorded was not hearsay in
itself. If the contents of the business records were not within the personal
knowledge of the entrant, a separate hearsay exception is required to
make them admissible.30
Missouri has adopted the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Law.31 The statute authorizes the admission of business records as an
exception to the hearsay rule where: (1) the custodian or other qualified
witness testifies to their identity and mode of preparation; 82 (2) the
records were made in the regular course of business at or near the time
of the act, condition, or event in question;3 3 and (3) the court finds that
the sources of information and method and time of preparation justify
their admission.3 4
28. The theory for excluding hearsay is that the competency of a statement
or assertion is not assumed unless the maker of the statement can be cross-
examined. For Missouri cases applying the hearsay rule see Jefferson v. Biggar,
416 S.W.2d 933 (Mo. 1967); Shaw v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 344 S.W.2d 32 (Mo.
1961); Gough v. General Box Co., 302 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1957); Meyers v. Smith,
300 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. 1957); Cottonseed Delinting Corp. v. Roberts Bros., 218
S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1949); Johnson v. Thompson, 241 Mo. App. 1008, 236 S.W.2d 1
(Spr. Ct. App. 1950); Hughes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 179 S.W.2d 630 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1944).
29. See C. McComuCX, supra note 1, § 310.
30. See PRoP. FeD. R- Evm. 803 (6) (Rev. Draft 1971).
31. In some instances, the use of a document does not involve a hearsay
problem because the document is admitted merely to show that it exists, not
to prove the truth of its contents. The Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Law is contained in §§ 490.660-.690, RSMo 1969. For a discussion of the business
records exception under this statute see Lauer, Business Records as Evidence in
Missouri, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 24.
82. See Fontana v. Davis, 882 S.W.2d 835 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964).
33. See Bolling Co. v. Barrington Co., 898 S.W.2d 28 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965);
Rodenberg v. Nickels, 357 S.W.2d 551 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
34. Stewart v. Sioux City & N.O. Barge Lines, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 205 (Mo.
1968); Kraus v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 269 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1954).
5
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The requirement of first hand knowledge is not enumerated in the
uniform act 35 and case law is inconclusive. In Ryan v. Campbell "66"
Express, Inc.,3 6 the Missouri Supreme Court indicated that the hearsay
exception provided by the uniform act does not cure all hearsay problems
merely because the evidence was in the form of a business record. The
court stated that the uniform law "eliminates the hearsay objection when
such a record is properly qualified thereunder, but it does not make
admissible any evidence which would be incompetent if offered in per-
son."3 7 Thus, the statute does not completely eliminate the requirement
of first hand knowledge. Under Ryan, compliance with the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Law will not, ipso facto, be sufficient to
survive a double hearsay objection to the admission of business records.
The official records exception to the hearsay rule is related to the
business records exception. 38 The official records exception has not been
codified in Missouri in the same manner as the business records excep-
tion. Instead, many specific statutes qualify particular official records as
an exception to the hearsay rule.
The official records exception provides that written statements of
public officials made by an official, pursuant to an official duty, upon
first hand knowledge of the facts, are admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule to show the truth of their contents.3 9 The exception requires
that the record be made "pursuant to an official duty," in contrast to
the business records exception requirement that the record be made in
the "ordinary course of business". 40 Although Missouri apparently fol-
lows this requirement strictly, it has not been strictly followed elsewhere
when the information contained in the record was reported by one
with a professional though not an official or public duty to make the
35. It appears that the first hand knowledge requirement is left to the
discretion of the court, under the general provision that the business recordbe admissible only "if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information...
were such as to justify its admission." § 490.680 RSMo 1969. See generally C. Mc.
Coitnxc, supra note 1, § 310.
36. 304 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. En Bane 1957).
37. Id. at 828; see Capra v. Phillips Inv. Co., 302 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. En
Banc 1957); Ensminger v. Stout, 287 S.W.2d 400 (K.C. Mo. App. 1956). In
many instances, the record is clearly admissible although the entrant lacks per-
sonal knowledge of the information he is recording. It appears that the double
hearsay problem will only bar the admission of a business record where neither
the entrant nor any employee who had a duty to report to the entrant had per.
sonal knowledge of the facts. Lauer, supra note 31; cf. Kansas City Stockyards Co.
v. A. Reich & Sons, Inc., 250 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1952). However, Professor Lauer's
conclusion that in some instances business records containing double hearsay
are admissible under the uniform law is based on cases involving the official
records exception to the hearsay rule.
38. Lauer, supra note 31, at 45.
39. See Capra v. Phillips Inv. Co., 302 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. En Banc 1957);
State v. Tarwater, 293 Mo. 273, 239 S.W. 480 (1922). For a general discussion
see C. McComvicK, supra note 1, § 315.
40. The purpose of these two requirements is to insure the trustworthiness
of the written statements.
[Vol. 38
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report.4 1 The drafters of the Proposed Rules deleted the official duty
requirement completely. 42
In Missouri, the requirement that the official have first hand knowl-
edge of the contents has been relaxed in one instance-where the official
record includes conclusions or summaries of an investigating official or
agency.43 This requirement has been eased because the existence of a
public, official, or professional duty assures the reliability of statements,
conclusions, or summaries. 44 To the extent that this requirement of first
hand knowledge is relaxed, the official records exception permits the
admission of documents that contain conclusions of the author and would
otherwise be subject to a double hearsay objection.
III. MISSOURI STATUTES RELATING TO THE
ADmISSION OF DocuMENTs AS EVIDENCE
Missouri has enacted numerous statutes dealing with the admission
of documents in evidence. Depending on the language of the particular
statute and its interpretation, those statutes may facilitate admission of
documents in evidence. The statute may satisfy the requirements of
authentication. The statutes outline procedures and requirements that,
if followed closely, will avoid the requirement that the document's pre-
parer authenticate it in court.
Most of these statutes deal with the admission of copies of documents,
also. They usually require the signature and/or seal of an official with
the responsibility of safekeeping, preparing, or recording the original
document. This certification will normally satisfy all authentication re-
quirements for the admission of copies. For example, section 446.850 states:
Copies of plats, surveys, entries, New Madrid certificates and
locations, and of all other papers which are by law required to
be deposited or kept in the office of the surveyor of the lands of
41. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1633a (3d ed. 1940). Contra, White v.
Hasburgh, 124 S.W.2d 560 (K.C. Mo. App. 1939); Gass v. United Rys. Co., 282
S.W. 160 (St. L. Mo. App. 1920).
42. PROP. FED. R. Evm. 803 (a) (Rev. Draft 1971).
43. See Simpson v. Wells, 292 Mo. 301, 237 S.W. 520 (1922). But see Kansas
City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich &c Sons, Inc., 250 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1952);
King v. New Empire Ins. Co., 364 S.W.2d 40 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962); Schmidt v.
Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 207 S.W. 874 (St. L. Mo. App. 1919).
44. A skilled investigator can be presumed to report as accurate or rely
on a hearsay statement only after inequiry into its accuracy. Often such
an inquiry by one professionally equpped to make it well and on the
scene at a time when events are fresh and inquiry is more likely to be
fruitful, could be relied upon to assure the reliability of those hearsay
statements upon which he relies. Much the same could be said of his
conclusions. In both cases, it is dear that the report and its conclusions
are recognized by all concerned to lay the foundation for future official
action, which is likely to stimulate the same habitual accuracy in report-
ing facts known that underlies the exception for official records generally.
C. McCoRnuca, supra note 1, § 317 at 738. The Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence follow this theory in allowing the admission of "factual findings" in
a public record or statement. PROP. FED. R. Evn. 803 (8) (Rev. Draft 1971).
7
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the United States in this state, duly certified by such surveyor,
shall be received as evidence.45
This statute makes copies of these documents admissible in evidence
(assuming they are not inadmissible on other grounds) if properly certi-
fied, without further authentication (i.e., testimony of the surveyor that
the document is what it purports to be and that it is a true and accurate
copy).
Statutes that satisfy authentication requirements and allow the use
of copies as evidence usually state that such documents "shall be received
in evidence" or "shall be received in evidence the same as originals."
Where the statute refers to the admission of copies and specifies that
such documents "shall be received in evidence," the production of the
original may be required to satisfy the best evidence rule.
Many statutes go a step further and bring statements contained in
the documents within an exception to the hearsay rule. For example,
where the document is an official record, the statute dealing with the
use of the document as evidence will generally establish those facts neces-
sary to bring the document within the official records exception to the
hearsay rule. Thus, strict compliance with the statute will allow the
admission of the document as evidence, without further proof of authenti-
cation, to prove the truth of those facts therein stated that were within
the personal knowledge of the public official in charge of the document.
In addition, some statutes deal with documents that are not official records,
In some instances, the statutes reflect a relaxation of the requirement
that the document be prepared pursuant to an official duty, thus facilitat-
ing the admission of hearsay statements contained in records kept by
persons who are not public officials. Other statutes deal with business
records and either restate the requirements of the statutory business
records hearsay exception or make business records not so qualifying
admissible under limited circumstances. In either instance, once the
requirements of the statute have been met, further proof to bring the
documents within the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law is not
required.
Whether these statutes aid in the admission in evidence of docu-
ments involving double hearsay problems is unclear. Arguably, in some
limited circumstances (see tables), statements not within the personal
knowledge of the person who prepared the document are admissible
without further proof.
The following pages contain a compilation of the numerous statutes
that aid in the admission of documents as evidence. The statutes are
organized alphabetically under specific headings. The statutes are ar-
ranged in tables within each heading. The tables first show the documents
covered by the statute and the section number. The reader should refer
to the specific language of the statute and the applicable case law as
these tables are not exhaustive. Following the statute number is a series
of four columns. An X in one of these columns indicates that a specific
evidentiary problem presented by admission of the document in evidence
45. § 446.350, RSMo 1969.
[Vol. 38
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is satisfied by compliance with the statute. An X in the column headed
Auth. indicates that the document is admissible without further authenti-
cation. An X in the column headed Copies indicates that under the statute,
copies are competent evidence and are admissible without further proof
that they are true and accurate copies of the original document. Use
of a copy, however, is likely to remain subject to a best evidence objection
unless the language of the statute indicates that the copy will be treated
as an original or will be given like weight as the original for evidentiary
purposes. The comments in the tables will indicate where the statute
thus dispenses with the best evidence requirement. Appropriate designa-
tion in the column headed Hrsy. signifies that the document qualifies for
an exception to the hearsay rule. Where the language of the statute indi-
cates that the document falls within the official records exception, the
abbreviation Off Rec will appear in the column. Where the business
records exception seems applicable, Bus Rec will be indicated. Where
the document is used in evidence only to show that it exists, no hearsay
problems are presented. The fourth column, headed by Dbl. Hrsy. per-
tains to admission of documents containing double hearsay statements
under the provisions of the statute. Figures in this column indicate that
a statement not within the personal knowledge of the document declarant
is admissible under the statute. Where the language of the statute is not
clear but there is case law interpreting the statutory language, this will
be indicated in the appropriate column by a footnote.
IV. STATUTES WHICH RELATE GENERALLY TO THE
USE oF DocuxsENTs AS EVIDENCE
Finally, there are statutes dealing with the production of documents
into evidence. Sections 510.030 and 510.060 deal with the discovery rules
which relate to compelling the production of documents into evidence.46
In addition, numerous statutes give various officials power to compel
the production of documents and deal with other specific problems in
this area.47
46. For a general discussion of this area see Robert, Production of Books
and Papers in Civil Cases, 6 ST. Louis L. REv. 20 (1921).
47. The folloing sections of the Missouri Revised Statutes, 1969, give
various officials power to compel the production of documents into evidence:§ 138.040 (county board of equalization); § 139.260 (circuit court in tax pro-
ceedings against the county collector); § 136.090 (state collector of revenue);
§ 85.500 (civil service commission-second class cities); § 41.640 (courts martial);
§ 147.100 (tax commission corporate franchise tax); § 145.160 (inheritance tax
appraiser); § 144.340 (director of revenue-sales tax-no exemption from produc-
tion of documents for investigation); § 144.645 (use tax); § 78.370 (city council-
third class cities-commission form of government); § 288.230 (industrial com-
mission-employment security hearings); § 381.140 (superintendent of insurance-
hearing under title insurance law); § 369.500 (superintendent of insurance-
examination of savings and loan association); § 491.100 (subpoena duces tecum);
& Mo. R. Cium. P. 25.19 (subpoena duces tecum, criminal cases); § 492.280 (court-
production of documentary evidence on taking depositions); § 510.030 (pretrial
examination order); §§ 515.130, .140 (referees in civil action); § 490.650 (court-
account book-action on account): §§ 416.230, .330, .400 (antitrust proceedings-
production not excused); § 79.180 (board of alderman proceedings-fourth class
cities); §§ 73.270, 75.170, 77.100 (city council proceedings); § 139.260 (county
9
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Other statutes aim at simplifying the use of documentary evidence at
trial. For example, section 510.010 provides for a pretrial conference,
one of the functions of which is to obtain the admission of documents.
An alternative approach is provided by section 510.050, which deals with
requests for admission of relevant documents.
Where the document sought to be admitted in evidence is written
in a foreign language, section 490.620 provides that a written translation
by a competent translator, verified by his affidavit, may be read in
evidence if the original would be competent evidence.
RHONDA CHURCHILL THOMAS
collector default proceedings); § 50.160 (county courts-audit and settlement of
claims); § 332.340 (dental examiner); §§ 374.190, 380.420 (examination of in.
surance company); § 107.150 (governor-official bond investigations); §§ 336.110,
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The statutes are arranged under the headings in the table as follows:
Type of Document
I. OmcI REcoRDs
A. Constitutions, Statutes, Case Law and Legislative History
B. Documents Filed in or Issuing from Public Offices
C. Records of Official Proceedings and Court-Approved Documents
D. Documents Relating to Specific Subjects
1. Bonds
2. Registered Trademarks, Brands, Union Labels, Etc.
3. Deeds and Other Instruments Affecting Real Estate
4. Documents Relating to Decedents' Estates
5. Documents Relating to Business Organizations
6. Miscellaneous Documents
II. BusnEss RECORDS




Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence



















































































Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence



















































Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/8
. 1 1 4s " 5 ', ) ) d o 4) 0,k' ,'
s 0 0.o 40
ul 0 U0so:j 4E
P1 ~ dC ;4r EI
0 a) 0 w 0
- 0 Cd ,W k








wl.2A, I ) 4 1




) o ca 
A) *
.400 02 4 
*,
git o C, " " '
C3. .
4- )C. C C)
15
Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence






































































































Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence









































Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/8





83 ( ) .2 z
-4 0,, a d ;S 40
02
d) a)4 g, 42 "
U2 o 0C
L0A o0$4a4 tO l;rIbnI rrCo di)'++Cu.8
0 o q 0
oo U2C)1-kkt 4q*6 . ;4 )Q
U0 A~ p9 rC C.u
4 o --4
ak rd Cf C 0
D C 0 a) d ') 4
0 -0 
4 (;3E)a 2a; . U
19
Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence
























































Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/8
roo P
040 ro '. C.) 0 . 4a
0 IV (1 n d) -
0 0 , ).! i c
;q0
a, 0* 0 d
41 0
-a 00a)
~~~41 k ~ ~ o
-P. a) cu 2oo, W ~ o'~
c4g *0 a)9 0 P4
0 U2~
0a M~4- -0 (DI~
4.40 (D0 414
04- Npl N:- i 0$4 00
0 r4 0 0 :00C
c'I0 .k,' ;;a
00 ~00k
0 0 O ,0W
0 i oC 0 Q) o 22-
0 0 'd
0 ~ 0 ~U2 r .2i p0- ,.l Zia 0 0 0 71 -' t
,g WP4 :0 
0 4
C)o~c M Aorzi 0
21
Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence

































































Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence



























































































































0 a) I (1)rA C4
25
Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence















































































































Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence
















































- wo c"r- V2
0~ 0 dQ t
04Q ;, t* -,
co 6! 0
44 0>0 U~*
fri 4.. f4ri fr
0a ;~ '0
0 0 Q10 I 1
2)c 0- . 0
o~ 43 0 , VzcriU24a ci
~~CO 00~ ~0
Qp~pri PTio -640 " '0 -4d o t
29
Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence















Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/8
q-4 t n IeD a
Wfl 0-00.a
O-I d) C4 0 0)
w) () Uf 9 C) o
0) d-' 1
c':i g o.a)a) cu0U-
ct 4) k a)0) M) P
a)3 t 02( 4l)0
Cj 0 4= C.) +.
0,72 _ 0
0,0 4~ Jd OW4d +; 11 .
k ~ a) 0) r0 0
o- En 0 Q
r- 0 0~ W0
P4 to m
N- N1 A *vc NU
N U N a) 0
r-) cord o a0
a CL) A P4 ~~o a.04d
k~~ 00 0 4 0 L
4 0U 4 -.2 2 '-o
A; 0 ) ) 0 Ea U ,-
oa D ) 0a))D 00
. ~ 0.0
E02~4 rdL rzCl P oo
31
Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence



























































































Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
;40 t, k D; ) 1 i )a
0 KV d 0 0 ~u 14
0P4 d 0







ci L) > k bZ~'
* qcd CD (L) ca P
Oc4c 0o ro r 0
b~ 
di 
X EA-a 0 _) C.
34













































































Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence





























































Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence

















































































Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence






































































Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence






















































































































Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence








































Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/8
d) a (1) . 0 to E00 6v "g: 00-,0
lz0 -4 o0 (
d)~ 00
r0~ d) En4~ 0. d
0D d) 0 CM 0 P
o% P Ic a 0 0 0
-H Z cu 0 C d
>10 C's;40 * 0j
2) a) ~ (8 2 2 o . V d
L a, 0 80
$04 0 )Q i k
S0 O2, ; -,.o-5 aQ
.iou 0l 0 ;4 P4.-,
0, o
4, 54 a)00a









Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973




0 0 d) d)
!4'. -00- .
C, "NU) c 4 ) 9 Id ci
c2 u r,4 -
- d '0, 4, 0 d) 4 P a) U2~
03 ;q 0 ;4 0 C
d) 4 0 4 0 tso ;
0)) N 14P
0 d oc 0 C
'.4 b @ t
a) 11 0 0u
U). w30 0 U) )
0 ;~4 0 a
;j3 m -q00
C3 M 0CD 0 a
m  P M P pq
46








Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence














Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/8
r41
to E n'o4-4 t2
o bo
Cd Mto, a a)- •
d)G










g1 a) C. ta
cdI c
ro 0













Thomas: Thomas: Documents as Evidence



























Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss3/8
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48. See Phillips v. Board of Adjustment, 308 S.W.2d 765 (St. L. Mo. App.
1958) where the court stated:
It is the law that a record kept or prepared by a person whose public duty
it is to record the facts stated in the document is admissible as evidence
of such facts. And where no formal manner of keeping or attesting such
records is prescribed by statute the records are competent evidence when
a foundation for their admission is laid by the clerk's testimony that
they are the records which they purport to be and were prepared by
the clerk in the performance of the derk's official duty.
Id. at 768 (citations omitted).
49. The following documents have been held admissible under this section
when duly certified: Municipal records, Kansas City v. Brown, 286 Mo. 1, 227 S.W.
89 (1920); State v. Heffernan, 243 Mo. 442, 148 S.W. 90 (1912); but see City of
Hannibal v. Richards, 35 Mo. App. 15 (St. L. Ct. App. 1889); birth certificates,
Finer v. Nichols, 122 Mo. App. 497, 99 S.W. 808 (St. L. Ct. App. 1907); death
certificates, Ohmeyer v. Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle, 91 Mo. App. 189 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1901); Reynolds v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 88 Mo. App. 679
(K.C. Ct. App. 1901); minutes of city council meetings, State ex rel. Johnson
v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (St. L. Ct. App. 1901); books of account, St. Louis
Gaslight Co. v. City of St. Louis, 11 Mo. App. 55 (St. L. Ct. App. 1881), aff'd, 84
Mo. 202 (1884); school district records, Mansur ex Tel. Fowler v. McKown, 315
Mo. 1336, 290 S.W. 123 (1926). Hospital records made pursuant to a city ordinance
are not public records within the terms of this section. See Connor v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 78 Mo. App. 131 (St. L. Ct. App. 1899).
50. The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act has been enacted
in Missouri. The provisions are located in §§ 490.070- .120, RSMo 1969. Section
490.080 of the Missouri enactment states: "Every court of this state shall take
judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory and other
jurisdiction of the United States."
51. In connection with this statute see § 509.220, RSMo 1969.
52. Hearsay evidence contained in a printed legislative journal is inadmissible,
notvithstanding this section. See Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107
S.W. 496 (1907), appeal dismissed, 215 U.S. 589 (1909), rev'd on other grounds,
Houston v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 249 Mo. 332, 155 S.W. 1068 (1913).
53. See State v. Wray, 109 Mo. 594, 19 S.W. 86 (1891); City of Poplar Bluff
v. Meadows, 187 Mo. App. 450, 173 S.W. 11 (Spr. Ct. App. 1915).
54. See Selders v. Kansas City, Ft. S. &c G.R.R., 19 Mo. App. 334 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1885). But see Brannock v. St. Louis, M. & S.E.R.R., 200 Mo. 561, 98 S.W.
604 (1907).
55. See note 46 supra.
56. See note 47 supra.
57. In connection with this section, see § 99.150, RSMo 1969, which creates
a presumption of validity of housing authority bonds.
58. See Jones v. Eaton, 307 Mo. 172, 270 S.W. 105 (En Banc 1925).
59. Records under this section are prima fade evidence.
60. For further interpretation of the scope of this requirement see State v.
Hendrix, 331 Mo. 658, 56 S.W.2d 76 (1932).
61. See State v. Warren, 317 Mo. 843, 297 S.W. 397 (1927). But see State
v. Hendrix, 331 Mo. 658, 56 S.W.2d 76 (1932), which overrules this case in
part. See also Florschiem & Co. v. Fry, 109 Mo. App. 487, 84 S.W. 1023 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1904); State v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 4 S.W. 931 (1887).
62. This provision of the statute means that the auditor must file and
preserve authenticated copies of the record made by the bond issuer showing
that all conditions of the law were complied with in the issuance of the bond.
This is required because the auditor is not authorized to hold hearings and
take and preserve evidence dehors the record for the purpose of determining
the fact. See State ex rel. School Dist. v. Smith, 336 Mo. 703, 80 S.W.2d 858 (1935).
63. See Lewis W. Thompson & Co. v. Conran-Gideon Special Road Dist.,
323 Mo. 953, 20 S.W.2d 1049 (1929).
64. See Kansas City v. City of Raytown, 421 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. 1967).
19731
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65. In O'Donnell v. Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 21 S.W.2d 762 (1929), the court
required that the certificate be executed by a person with a duty to so act to be
admissible in evidence.
66. See State v. Worden, 331 Mo. 566, 56 S.W.2d 595 (1932). There, the court
stated:
Since original certificates of that character are required by the statute,
section 9058, Revised Statutes 1929, to be permanently kept, such
a certificate becomes an official record, which is always admissible in
evidence. A copy of a public paper required to be filed, certified by the
officer intrusted with its custody, is admissible in evidence if the original
is admissible.
Id. at 572-73, 56 S.W.2d at 598.
67. In Missouri, the general rule is that the certificate is prima fade evidence
only of statements of fact contained therein, required by statute to be included
in the certificate, which are within the issuer's personal knowledge. See Randolph
v. Supreme Liberty Life Ins. Co., 215 S.W.2d 82 (St. L. Mo. App. 1948), aff'd, 359
Mo. 251, 221 S.W.2d 155 (En Banc 1949); Key v. Cosmopolitan Life Ins. Co., 102
S.W. 797 (St. L. Mo. App. 1937). But see Simpson v. Wells, 292 Mo. 301, 2,37
S.W. 520 (1922).
68. See Crollard v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 240 Mo. App. 355, 200 S.W.2d
375 (1947).
69. A copy of a survey is admissible under this section. See Wood v. Nort-
man, 85 Mo. 298 (1884).
70. See State v. Elam, 21 Mo. App. 290 (K.C. Ct. App. 1886), rev'd on other
grounds, State v. Martin, 44 Mo. App. 45 (St. L. Ct. App. 1891).
71. Records of temperature kept by officials of the United States Weather
Bureau are competent prima fade evidence although the official had no per-
sonal knowledge of the matter recited if the document was intended to be kept
as a memorial. See Wheeler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 298 Mo. 619, 251 S.W. 924
(En Banc 1923).
72. Case law suggests that office records of the United States are prima
fade evidence. Id.
73. Surveys made in accordance with this section are prima facie evidence
without further proof of their correctness. See State v. Turpin, 196 S.W.2d 798
Mo. 1948); Clark v. McAtee, 227 Mo. 152, 127 S.W. 37 (1910); Watson v.
Matson, 183 Mo. App. 298, 166 S.W. 828 (St. L. Ct. App. 1914).
74. See State ex rel. Gott v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 317 Mo. 1078, 298 S.W.
83 (1927); Bergman v. Supreme Tent, Knights of Maccabees, 203 Mo. App.
685, 220 S.W. 1029 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920); Davis v. Gillman, 71 Mo. App. 498
(1897), rev'd, State ex rel. Gott v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., supra.
75. See Lancaster v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 121 (1876), rev'd, State
ex rel. Gott v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 317 Mo. 1078. 298 S.W. 83 (1927); In re
Buck's Estate, 204 Mo. App. 1, 220 S.W. 716 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920).
76. Records and proceedings of common law courts are admissible to prove
the existence of such records and proceedings, but they are not evidence of
the truth of the facts therein recited. See Carney v. Carney, 95 Mo. 353, 8 S.W.
729 (1888).
77. Under § 490.490, RSMo 1969, the original may be required in some
circumstances. Section 490.500 provides for the admission of a record copy where
the original is lost.
78. See note 77 supra.
79. Acknowledgment of a deed and certification of the acknowledgment
under this section is prima fade proof of signing and delivery. See Keener v.
Williams, 307 Mo. 682, 271 S.W. 489 (1925); Harrison v. Edmonston, 248 S.W. 586
(Mo. 1923); Barbee v. Farmers Bank, 240 Mo. 297, 144 S.W. 839 (1912); Burk
v. Pence, 206 Mo. 315, 104 S.W. 23 (1907). Under § 490.430, RSMo 1969, docu-
ments covered by this section are not conclusive evidence. And § 490.440, RSMo
1969 provides that when proof of such instrument is contested, neither such
instrument nor the record thereof shall be received in evidence until established
by other competent evidence.
[Vol. 3;8
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80. Under § 490.300, RSMo 1969, such deed is admissible in evidence, though§ 490.290 is not complied with, if the court is satisfied that the person who
executed the instrument is the person named as grantor.
81. Section 490.330, RSMo 1969, provides the procedure to be followed by
the courts when evidence is offered to reject such copy.
82. See § 60.370, RSMo 1969, which deals with the admission in evidence
of certified copies of surveyor's field notes and § 60.150, RSMo 1969 relates to
the use of surveys as evidence.
83. Section 141.610, RSMo 1969, provides that sheriff's deeds falling within
its provisions are presumptively valid.
84. See § 546.300, RSMo 1969, which deals with proof of the existence of a
banking corporation in criminal cases.
85. See State v. Wagner, 311 Mo. 891, 279 S.W. 23 (1925), where the court
held that manufacturer's records were admissible in evidence although the
entries were not made by the witness or under his immediate direction.
86. See § 361.030, RSMo 1969.
87. The best evidence of the existence of a partnership consists of the agree-
ment or contract between the parties, but a partnership may be proved by any
competent evidence. See Ehrlicher v. Turner, 232 S.W. 743 (St. L. Mo. App. 1921).
88. In an action against alleged partners, letters from a defendant, against
whom the case had been dismissed, held incompetent against a co-defendant as
hearsay and mere legal conclusions. See Hely v. Hinerman, 303 Mo. 147, 260
S.W. 471 (1924).
89. Section 400.3-414, RSMo 1969, provides that endorsers of negotiable
instruments are prima fade liable in the order in which they endorse.
90. A notarial protest is not evidence that the reason for nonpayment of
a check was that the drawee held no funds of the drawer. Nelson v. Kastle,
105 Mo. App. 187, 79 S.W. 730 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904).
91. See note 76 supra.
92. Under § 417.090, RSMo 1969, no evidence admitted in any civil action
under this section may be used in any criminal prosecutions.
93. See Anchor Milling Co. v. Walsh, 108 Mo. 277, 18 S.W. 904 (1892);
Negley B. Calvin Inc. v. Cornet, 427 S.W.2d 741 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Wagoner
Undertaking Co. v. Jones, 134 Mo. App. 101, 114 S.W. 1049 (St. L. Ct App.
1908).
94. In State v. Wagner, 311 Mo. 391, 279 S.W. 23 (1926), manufacturer's
records were held admissible even though entries were not made by the witness
or under his immediate direction.
95. In Arnold v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 231 Mo. App. 508,
101 S.W.2d 729 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937), the court held that records of births and
baptisms of the church were admissible where the minister identified the
documents and testified that the record was kept according to the laws and
customs of the church.
96. The Uniform Business Records Law has eliminated the hearsay objec-
tion in that it dispenses with the necessity of producing in court the person
who has made the record. Nevertheless, the statute does not ordinarily make
a statement admissible which is not within the personal knowledge of the issuer.
See Baugh v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1957).
97. In Schaefer v. Lowell-Krekeler Grocery Co., 49 S.W.2d 209 (St. L. Mo. App.
1932), the court permitted the introduction of hospital records containing an
injured employee's admissions that he suffered from epilepsy prior to the acd-
dent.
98. See State ex rel. Carroll v. Dewitt, 107 Mo. 573, 17 S.W. 900 (1891); Hill-
Behan Lumber Co. v. Sellers, 149 S.W.2d 465 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941).
99. An officer's return is conclusive upon parties to a suit, and an injured
party must seek his remedy for a false return against the officer on his bond.
See Johnson v. Wilson Estate, Inc., 256 S.W.2d 297 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953); Shan-
non v. Del-Home Light Co., 43 S.W.2d 872 (St. L. Mo. App. 1931).
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